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Case No. 20020025-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1 a-1316(2) (1998). This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: Was eyewitness testimony identifying defendant as the driver of a stolen 
Kia combined with evidence that defendant and a passenger were found out of breath 
nearby minutes after the Kia was stopped sufficient to support defendant's conviction for 
possession of a stolen motor vehicle? 
Standard of Review: A jury verdict will be reversed for insufficient evidence 
only when, "after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, U 18, 10 P.3d 346 (citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1998) provides: 
It is a second degree felony for a person: 
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or 
unlawfully taken if he is not a peace officer engaged at the time in 
the performance of his duty. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with possession of a stolen motor vehicle, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1998) (R. 3-5). A 
jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 75; 100:103-04). The trial court sentenced 
defendant to a statutory indeterminate prison term of one to fifteen years (R. 79-81). That 
sentence was suspended, and defendant was placed on probation (R. 79-81). Defendant 
timely appealed (R. 83-84). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On the evening of August 25, 2001, Officer David Malley had just arrested and 
placed an individual in the back of his police car at 300 South and West Temple, when he 
lThe facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 2, 12 P.3d 92 
2 
noticed a green Kia quickly swerving through traffic without its lights on (R. 100:20-22). 
Recognizing a safety violation, Officer Malley activated his emergency lights (R. 
100:22). As he did, the Kia quickly turned down an alley ending in a parking lot at 200 
West and Pierpont Avenue (R. 100:22, 24-25). Malley pursued the Kia into the alley (R. 
100:22). When the Kia reached the parking lot, the Kia braked abruptly and all four car 
doors opened (R. 100:22-23). Three of the people in the car took off running; the fourth 
remained by the Kia, where he was detained by Malley (R. 100:23, 25, 26). 
The driver of the Kia, a darker-skinned male wearing a white shirt, took off 
immediately to the west (R. 100:25-26, 27). The passenger behind him, who was wearing 
a grey shirt, hesitated for a moment and then ran in the same direction as the driver (R. 
100:25-26). The passenger in the right-side back seat took off to the north (R. 100:25). 
Officer Malley immediately radioed dispatch, related the event, and issued a 
description of the occupants and their direction of flight (R. 100:26). He then checked the 
Kia's vehicle identification number and confirmed that the car was stolen (R. 100:26). 
Officer Steve Cutler was driving to work near Officer Malley's location when he 
heard the description of the suspects on the radio (R. 100:47-48). He immediately began 
looking for individuals that fit that description (R. 100:48). Almost instantly, Cutler 
noticed two males who fit the description about a block and a half from Malley's location 
(R. 100:49, 51). When Cutler stopped to talk with them, he noticed that both males were 
breathing hard and sweating (R. 100:49, 50). After Cutler informed Malley that he had 
3 
detained two people, Malley drove to Cutler's location to see if he could identify them (R. 
100:28). Malley recognized Andy Rasabout, the male who had been sitting behind the 
driver, "instantly" (R. 100:28). He was "80 to 85 percent" sure the other male, defendant, 
was the driver (R. 100:29). Upon questioning, Mr. Rasabout confirmed that defendant 
was the driver (R. 100:12, 13). 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
Defendant raises a sufficiency of the evidence claim on appeal. However, 
defendant does not claim there was insufficient evidence in the record to support his 
conviction. Rather, he claims that the jury should not have relied on that evidence. 
Specifically, defendant claims that the jury should not have believed Andy Rasabout 
because inconsistencies in his testimony and his fear of being charged rendered him not 
credible. He claims that the jury should not have believed Officer Malley because he 
could not identify defendant with one-hundred percent certainty. Because it is the sole 
province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their 
testimony, defendant's claim fails. 
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ARGUMENT 
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY IDENTIFYING DEFENDANT AS THE 
DRIVER OF THE STOLEN KIA COMBINED WITH EVIDENCE 
THAT DEFENDANT AND A PASSENGER WERE FOUND OUT OF 
BREATH NEARBY MINUTES AFTER THE KIA WAS STOPPED 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION 
FOR POSSESSION OF A STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE 
Defendant claims that the jury should not have convicted him of possession of a 
stolen motor vehicle because the evidence supporting his conviction was unreliable. Br. 
of Aplt. at 8-14. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
"[A] defendant must overcome a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of 
evidence for a jury verdict." State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, U 10, 2 P-3d 954. 
"[This Court] will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and all 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, [it] find[s] that the 
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing 
as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292, 
f 13, 13 P.3d 604 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "So long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, [this Court's] inquiry stops." State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
Section 41-la-1316(2) provides that any person who "[has] in his possession any 
motor vehicle . . . that he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully 
taken" is guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1 a-1316(2) 
(1998). 
5 
On appeal, defendant does not deny that he knew or had reason to believe that the 
green Kia was stolen. See Br. of Aplt. at 8-14. Rather, he challenges only the jury's 
finding that he possessed the Kia, i.e., that he was the driver. 
The record evidence supports defendant's conviction. The following evidence 
supports the jury's finding: On August 25, 2001, Officer David Malley attempted to stop 
a green Kia for a safety violation (R. 100:20-22). As the car stopped, Malley saw a dark-
skinned male with a white shirt exit the driver's door and run west (R. 100:25-26, 27). 
He saw a male wearing a grey shirt exit the back door on the driver's side and also run 
west (R. 100:25-26). Malley immediately radioed dispatch and provided a description of 
the occupants and their direction of flight (R. 100:26). Minutes later, Officer Steve Cutler 
detained two males about a block and a half away who matched Malley's description (R. 
100:48, 49, 51). Cutler noticed that both males were breathing hard and sweating (R. 
100:49, 50). Malley recognized one of those persons, Andy Rasabout, "instantly" as the 
male who had exited the Kia from the back door on the driver's side (R. 100:28). Malley 
was "80 to 85 percent" sure—"pretty certain but not absolutely certain"—the other 
person, defendant, was the person he saw driving the Kia (R. 100:29). Andy Rasabout 
admitted he was a passenger in the Kia and told police that defendant was the driver (R. 
100:12, 13). At trial, Rasabout gave the same testimony (R. 100:12-13). 
This evidence—the two eyewitness identifications combined with the fact that 
defendant was found with a passenger "breathing hard" and sweating within minutes of 
the Kia's being abandoned—is sufficient to support defendant's conviction. See, e.g., 
6 
State v. McCullar, 61A P.2d 117, 118-19 (Utah 1983) (affirming conviction based on 
accomplices testimony even though victims "could not testify that they were entirely 
certain that defendant was one of the men who robbed them"). 
Defendant argues, however, that the jury should not have relied on some of this 
evidence. Specifically, defendant claims that the jury should not have believed Andy 
Rasabout because inconsistencies in his testimony and his fear of being charged rendered 
him not credible. He claims that the jury should not have believed Officer Malley 
because he could not identify defendant with one-hundred percent certainty. Defendant's 
contentions lack merit. 
It was the sole province of the jury to determine the weight of Andy 
Rasabout's testimony. Defendant claims the jury should not have relied on this 
evidence because Andy initially "lied to the police about knowing" another passenger in 
the car that night, because he gave slightly varying stories concerning what happened that 
night, because he said he was in the car longer than it should have taken to get where he 
was going, because he "had particular incentive to lie . . . to please his older friends and to 
protect himself from retribution," and because his testimony was "given in exchange for 
favorable treatment by the prosecution." Aplt. Br. at 9-11. None of these contentions 
render Rasabout's testimony insufficient to support defendant's conviction. 
First, "[a]lleged inconsistencies . . . simply go to the weight of the testimony and 
are factual questions for the jury to determine." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 544 
(Utah 1994). Second, defendant's conviction "could be had solely on the testimony of 
7 
[an accomplice,] if the jury determined the testimony to be credible" even if such 
testimony is "'self contradictory, uncertain or improbable.'" State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 
1052, 1055 & n.3 (Utah 1985) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(2)); see also State v. 
Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369 P.2d 494, 496 (Utah 1962) (holding witness's possible 
connection to crime "[n]either . . . disqualified him as a witness as to what the defendant 
did, nor rendered his testimony incompetent," but rather "only affected its credibility"); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(1) (1999) ("A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice."). 
As defendant's cases explain, a witness's testimony is rarely without flaws. The 
issue is whether the defendant was given the opportunity to explore those flaws on cross-
examination, thereby "permitting] the jury . . . to observe the demeanor of the witness 
making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility." Lee v. Illinois, 
476 U.S. 530, 540-41 (1986) (holding defendant's right to confrontation "is uniquely 
threatened when an accomplice's confession is sought to be introduced . . . without the 
benefit of cross-examination" because of co-defendant's "strong motivation to implicate 
the defendant and to exonerate himself); see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
673, 677 (1986) (holding trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant to cross-examine 
witness concerning agreements he had reached in return for his testimony because the 
ruling "kept from the jury facts concerning bias that were central to assessing [the 
witness's] reliability"); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974) (holding trial court 
erred in refusing to allow defendant to cross-examine key juvenile witness on fact that he 
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was on probation at the time he was questioned by police because right to confrontation 
includes ability to conduct "cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, 
prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness"); State v. Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1232-33 
(Utah 1980) (holding trial court erred in not allowing defendant to cross-examine witness 
concerning his "motive in testifying as he had"), disapproved of on other grounds by 
State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1983). C/ State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 
(Utah App. 1990) (upholding admission of accomplices' hearsay statements even though 
accomplices did not testify at trial and thus were not subject to cross-examination because 
they had sufficient indicia of reliability). 
Once that opportunity is provided, "'[i]t is within the exclusive province of the 
jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses] and the weight of the evidence." State v. 
Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, Tf 11,54 P.3d 645 (quoting State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 
(Utah 1982)) (first alternation in original); see also State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f 
40, 52 P.3d 1194 (holding that, "in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, [this Court] 
refuse[s] to 're-evaluate the credibility of witnesses or second-guess the jury's 
conclusion'") (citation omitted), cert denied, S.Ct. (Jan. 13, 2003). 
In this case, defendant had the opportunity to explore on cross-examination all the 
issues he now raises concerning Mr. Rasabout's testimony (R. 100:14-19; see also closing 
argument at R. 100:90-94). It was then within the exclusive province of the jury to decide 
to what extent Rasabout's testimony was credible. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, at ^ 11. 
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Defendant has not shown Officer Malley's eyewitness identification was 
unreliable. Defendant claims that the jury should not have relied on Malley's testimony 
because his identification of defendant was unreliable. Because defendant's claim is 
purely speculative, this Court should reject it. 
Upon proper objection by defendant, a trial court is required "to undertake 'an in-
depth appraisal'" of the reliability of an eyewitness's identification testimony before 
admitting such evidence. State v. Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, K 19,47 P.3d 115 
(citation omitted). Factors relevant to that appraisal include 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the 
event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of 
the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, including 
his or her physical and mental acuity; (4)whether the witness's 
identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and (4) the 
nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. 
Id. (quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991)) (alternation in original). 
Here, defendant never objected to Malley's eyewitness identification. Therefore, 
he waived any right to challenge the reliability of Malley's identification testimony on 
appeal. See State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (holding general rule in 
criminal cases is that '"a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an 
appellate court will review such claims on appeal'") (citation omitted). 
Moreover, because defendant did not object below, the record contains no 
evidence concerning how long and from what distance Malley was able to view 
10 
defendant, the extent to which Malley's attention to defendant was distracted by other 
things, and the extent to which Malley, a twenty-seven-year veteran of the police force, 
was impaired by excitement, nervousness, or confusion. 
Absent such evidence, defendant's suggestions that Malley's identification would 
not have passed muster under those factors because his "degree of attention was . . . 
reduced" since there were four suspects, because his "capacity to observe the driver was 
also limited by the excitement, nervousness, and confusion" at the scene, and because 
Malley suffered from "heightened nervousness and tension" are purely speculative. 
Thus, defendant cannot show the officer's identification was insufficient to support 
defendant's conviction. Cf. State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) 
(holding parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have duty and 
responsibility to support allegations with adequate record). 
As with Rasabout's testimony, defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine 
Malley and explore the issues he now raises concerning Malley's testimony (R. 100:31-
46 see also closing argument at R. 100:90-91, 93). It was then within the exclusive 
province of the jury to decide what weight should be given that testimony. Howell, 649 
P.2d at 97; Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, at^ 11. 
Because defendant has not shown that the evidence before the jury was insufficient 
to support its verdict, defendant's claim fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not 
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
Dated this 1^ day of February, 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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